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ABSTRACT 
 
Georgia Patrascu:  The Common European Asylum System and the 2015 European refugee crisis 
(Under the direction of Robert Jenkins) 
 
This thesis approaches the topic of migration and asylum seeking within the European 
Union and analyzes the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Through the use of the 
theory of intergovernmentalism it argues how CEAS was created and how states were able to 
bargain in order to cede control over irregular migrants to the European Union. Then by using 
the theory of securitization, it is argued that migration became securitized which lead Member 
States to reclaim power over migration and asylum seeking. 
 It will argue that the European Union’s response to the large increase in irregular 
migration into EU territory in 2015 shows the limits of the European institutional framework in 
the asylum policy. While there is much cooperation within the European Union, when faced with 
security issues, of which migration and asylum are a part, Member States are reticent of giving 
up sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The year 2015 was marked by many international events but one of the more influential 
and talked about events was the so called European refugee crisis. By the end of 2015 the 
European Union had seen a total of almost 1.3 million asylum applications which was twice as 
many as in 2014 and three times as many as in 2013 (Eurostat 2016a). The sheer amount of 
irregular migrants entering the EU, through whatever means they could find, has rendered the 
situation into a crisis by entering daily media and capturing political and public attention. Images 
of suffering and desperation flood the daily European psyche.   
In addition, it has become a larger issue due to the fact (in addition to no longer being 
processed in the first country in which they have entered the EU), that the irregular migrants are 
no longer staying in one place, but migrating towards the heart of the European Union to find 
better economic and social conditions. The Southern European states have not been able to 
sustain the sudden and constant influx and therefore the larger, wealthier European states have 
seen themselves forced to take the burden of resettling the migrants.  
As can be seen in Figure 1 there has been an increase annually in asylum seekers since 
the Arab Spring in 2011, started with a large spike in 2015.1 More in depth, in 2011, there was a 
total of 259,395 applications, while in 2015 there were 1,297,420 applications or an increase of 
400 percent in 5 years (Eurostat 2016a).
                                                
1 Eurostat publishes data monthly and an analysis piece every quarter. At the time of writing the data past 
January 2016 was not available. 
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Figure 1: Number of Asylum Seekers per Year since 2010 2 
 
The sudden influx of asylum seekers created problems for the existing European asylum 
system due to the European Union being unprepared for the situation due to its failures in policy 
fields such as immigration, border control and, most importantly, in the common European 
asylum policy (Lehne et el. 2015). Burden sharing regarding refugee relocation and protection 
has been difficult, with tensions running high within the European Union. 
To better understand the magnitude of the sudden influx of irregular migrants, Figure 2 
displays how, there was a steady increase monthly of the number of first time asylum applicants 
and then in fourth quarter of 2015 there was a sudden influx. Due to the scope of the paper, not 
all of the months will be explained and explored but it is important to note that with the 
                                                
2 The only month represented in the 2016 is January (see footnote 1). 
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appearance of ISIS and the worsening of the Syrian civil war, there is a direct correlation in the 
increase in asylum applications. 
 
 
Figure 2: First time asylum applicants since 2010 
 
First time asylum applicants increased by more than 130 percent in the fourth quarter of 
2015 compared to the same quarter in 20143 (Eurostat 2016b). First time applicants are those 
who have lodged an application for asylum for the first time in a given Member State and have 
never applied for international protection in any other Member State. Of those who applied, the 
top three citizenships of asylum seekers were Syrians, Afghanis and Iraqis with Syrians adding 
the most in absolute terms.4 
                                                
3 In the fourth quarter of 2014 there were 184,415 applicants and in same quarter a year later there were 
426,025 applicants (Eurostat 2016b). 
 
4 There were 145,100 Syrians, 79,300 Afghanis and 53,600 Iraqis which made them the top three 
citizenships of asylum seekers (Eurostat 2016b). 
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 Since 1999, with the Tampere Summit, the European Union has had a Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) in which EU Member States have shared the responsibility of 
welcoming asylum seekers and ensuring they were treated fairly no matter where an applicant 
applied. The policy however is made up of minimum requirements that can easily be forgotten or 
pushed aside with the reasoning of protecting national interests and internal security. 
CEAS stands on five directives or regulations creating a system made up of minimums 
(Apelblat 2016):5  
• Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) on establishing common grounds to grant international 
protection 
• Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU) on common standards of safeguards and 
guarantees to access a fair and efficient asylum procedure 
• Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU) on common standards of conditions of living 
of asylum applicants” 
• Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC) on minimum standards for giving temporary 
protection in the event of a mass influx of displace persons 
• Dublin III Regulation (2013/604/EU) on establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the member state responsible examining an application for asylum 
 
The Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 set out minimum standards for granting 
refugees status or subsidiary protection to non-EU country or stateless persons. Those who did 
not qualify for refugee status could apply for the subsidiary protection. However, the Directive is 
an example of the struggle in reaching harmonization in the field of asylum. The Commission’s 
proposal and the European Parliament’s amendments in the consultation process stressed the 
need for the protection of asylum seekers but the Council mostly focused on the prevention of 
abuse of the asylum system (Velluti 2014, 9-10). 
                                                
5 Regulations are binding legislative acts that must be applied in their entirety to the EU. A directive on 
the other hand is a legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve, however it is up 
to the individual Member States to devise their own laws on how to reach said goals (EU Law 2015). 
 
  5 
The Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU), streamlined the asylum application 
process, by making it more efficient and fairer for applicants while making sure that the 
international protection met EU-wide standards for granting and withdrawing international 
protection. It covered all applications for protection made in the EU countries at borders, in 
territorial waters or transit areas, with the exception of the UK, Ireland and Denmark, who have 
an opt-out agreement. The Directive set out that the process would not take longer than six 
months and when there was a question of national security, the process could and should take a 
shorter period of time. 
The Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU) made it clear that CEAS is a 
constituent part of the EU objective of establishing an area of freedom, security and justice that 
is opened to all those who are seeking protection in the Union. It also set up the rule that the 
asylum policy should be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair share of responsibility, 
which also includes financial burden sharing. 
The Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC) was characterized by the duration of 
the protection given to a large influx of refugees but did not have any rules for permanent 
resettlement, which is an important factor of the current crisis of irregular migration. The 
temporary protection is to be implemented in all Member States when the Council adopts, 
following a Commission proposal, a decision establishing a need for protection for a large influx 
of displaced persons (EUR-Lex 2001). 
The Directive set out the mechanism for how the protection would work and who would 
benefit from it. The duration can be of one year and can be extended to two years, and the 
beneficiary would be granted the right to employment, education, vocational training, suitable 
accommodations, social welfare and means of subsistence, medical care, application for asylum 
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and for those under the age of 18, to access the education system as any other national of a 
Member State (EUR-Lex, 2001). There were also mechanisms for minors and separated families 
and finally rules for how the protected individuals shall be returned.  The Directive, however was 
not used in the 2015 irregular migration crisis and the mandatory relocation quotas, currently in 
place, replaced it (Bednárová 2015). 
The Dublin III Regulation (2013) will be covered in depth in the next section. The Dublin 
Regulation became the norm on deciding who was responsible for processing an asylum 
application. Ultimately it became a way for Member States to protect themselves from costly 
deportations because asylum seekers would become the responsibility of the original Member 
State through which an asylum seeker first came. It went through many amendments throughout 
the years and the most current version is the 2013 version. 
When searching a clear a clear structure of CEAS it was found that scholars organized it 
in one way (the way presented above) and the European Union presented it a different way.6 
While the way the European Union organizes is not that different from how scholars organize it, 
it does speak to the fact that CEAS is not a coherent system, but a patchwork of directives and 
regulations that just create a common minimum standard that Member States have cooperated 
on.  
Irregular migration is now an issue of pre-border, border and post-border control 
(Morrison and Crosland 2001, 5). The current asylum policy is still reliant on very basic 
minimum asylum standards that replicate almost entirely current national standards and 
                                                
6 The scholars used in the paper speak of the system being made up of five parts as used in the thesis. The 
EU, when it explains CEAS, divides into five parts with some variations: Asylum Procedures Directive, 
Reception Conditions Directive, Qualification Directive, Dublin Regulation and Eurodac Regulation (http
://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/docs/ceas-fact-sheets/ceas_factsheet_en.pdf).  
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procedures as opposed to being a harmonized policy that all Member States can abide by 
(Boccardi 2007, 216). The asylum policy is also loosely based on an over simplified definition of 
‘irregular migration’ which includes all migrants who seem to be a threat to the European Union. 
Irregular migration, currently, is an instance where the power has stayed with the individual 
Member States and not with the EU institutions. 
The threat of ‘foreign-fighters’ entering European soil has led to the large influx of 
irregular migrants being portrayed as a security issue by the media, European governments and 
societies. Terrorist attacks such as the ones in Paris in 2015 and the growth of homegrown 
terrorism have created a situation where the perceived threat of being attacked drives policies 
both at the Member State and the EU institutional level. 
While there may be EU mechanisms to deal with a large influx of irregular migrants, 
these have not been used due to a lack of support from the Member States. Due to the fact that 
migration and asylum seeking cross the fine line between internal and external policy, Member 
States have chosen to deal with the situation internally and only minimally cooperate at the EU 
level. In September 2015, EU ministers decided to implement a quota system for all Member 
States. Some states were asked to resettle more refugees than others and many smaller states 
criticized the approach due to their social, economic and political inability to sustain a large 
amount of migration. The quota system has created tensions within the European Union and has 
shown the flaws of the European integration project when faced with strong Member States’ 
interests. 
This thesis will argue that the European Union’s response to the large increase in 
irregular migration into EU territory in 2015 shows the limits of the European institutional 
framework in the realm of asylum policy. While there is much cooperation within the European 
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Union, when faced with security issues, of which migration and asylum are a part, Member 
States will be reticent of giving up sovereignty. Throughout the paper, it will be shown that while 
the European Union does have the competency to deal with migration and asylum at an 
institutional level, Member States have limited the power of the Union and its institutions. The 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) created in 1999, at first an intergovernmental 
project seen as a positive by many Member States for sharing the burden of dealing with 
migrants and asylum-seekers, after 9/11 became a policy area where cooperation has been 
limited and Member States have maintained their sovereignty. While at first the Common 
European Asylum System was seen as a welcomed solution to the burden felt by large Member 
States to deal with large numbers of asylum seeking applications coming from people fleeing the 
Balkan Wars, after 9/11, and the subsequent securitization of migration, Member States saw 
themselves relying on national security measures to deal with asylum seekers as opposed to 
strengthening CEAS' directives. 
Political scientists, like the ones cited in this paper, have tried to explain how European 
integration has come about and how it will advance. The theory of intergovernmentalism will 
work as a theoretical explanation to the bargaining and sovereignty pooling during the creation 
and expansion of the European Union. In addition, features of intergovernmentalism will be seen 
in the origins of the Common European Asylum System prior to 9/11. Post 9/11 however, the 
primacy of state sovereignty and the securitization of migration due to its link to the War on 
Terror, constituted a major obstacle in the harmonization of common European asylum policy 
goals (Velluti 2014,4-6).  
In order to better understand how and why Member States securitized the issue of 
migration post-9/11, the theory of securitization will be explored. A constructivist theory, 
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securitization explains that migration and asylum policy is presented as a security threat by 
governments and international bodies in order to create legislation and institutions that ultimately 
end up militarizing social issues (Gerard 2014; Léonard 2010).  
Migration and asylum policy illustrate an underlying contradiction between increasing 
integration and intergovernmental cooperation while still maintaining national interests and 
powers, debilitating the EU’s ability to create common policy. Besides national interest 
challenging the integration process, the increasing securitization of migration and borders for 
many of the reasons argued in this paper, has rendered the EU capacity weak which can be seen 
in the response to the 2015 influx of irregular migrants. 
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CHAPTER 2: BASIC TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS 
The definition of “integration” / use to refer to European integration, is given by one of 
the most influential neofunctionalist writers, Leon Lindberg, who first came up with his concept 
in 1963. Lindberg (1963, 6) defines integration as a process with no end point, “whereby nations 
forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each 
other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new 
central organs” and where “political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their 
expectations and political activities to a new center.” The process of integration, requires that 
central institutions and central policies must develop, that the tasks assigned to said institutions 
must be important enough to activate socio-economic processes7 and that Member States must 
continue to see their interests align to those of the Union (Lindberg 1963, 7-8). 
Lindberg explained that the way through which integration happens and advances is in a 
situation where Member States resolve their conflicts of interest in such a way that allows the 
positive convergence of pro-integration aims. The only way states will be able to converge on a 
solution is by bargaining in exchange of equal concessions and coming up with a minimum 
common denominator on which they can all agree while never going beyond what the least 
cooperative of them is willing to concede (Lindberg 1963, 11-12).
                                                
7 The socio-economic processes about which Lindberg talks, are processes in which social and economic 
developments are made possible in European Member States due to their governments’ cooperation 
within the European Union forum. 
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Following the practice of the European Union, this thesis will use the term “irregular 
migration” and its grammatical derivations to describe those who have entered the EU territory 
through conditions that do not meet legal standards (EU Commission 2015, 2016). The terms 
“asylum seeker” and “refugee” will be used to give more dimension to the types of people who 
have crossed EU internal and external borders. 
Refugees are people who leave their country of origin because of fear of persecution and 
their status is granted on request from a state’s government after proving the dangerous situation. 
Asylum seekers are those who have applied for the refugee status and are expecting a decision. 
All refugees are initially asylum seekers but not all will be recognized as refugees in the end. 
While they expect a decision about their case, the term ‘asylum seekers’ defines the people 
entering the EU the best (Preja and Cerbu 2014, 74-75). 
Looking at the European Union terminology, one finds an incomplete definition, made up 
of different definitions from different sources. At first it seems to be an easy definition 
encompassing the different ways a person can move to a new place. Using the International 
Labor Organization definition, the European Commission (2016) defines irregular migration as 
the “movement of persons to a new place of residence or transit that takes place outside the 
regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries.” The synonyms given are 
“clandestine migration, illegal immigration, illegal migration, unauthorised migration, 
undocumented migration,” where only the term “unauthorized migration” describes the status 
quo, while the others demonize the migrant and his or her journey.8 In the securitization 
                                                
8 The Commission (2016) even explains in its definition in a note that “there is no universally accepted 
definition of irregular migration” and that it all depends on the destination or the sending country. What 
that means is that from the perspective of a destination country, the entry, stay or work within a country 
without the necessary authorization or documents is defined as irregular migration. From the perspective 
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discussion it will become apparent that the way the political authors refer to things can influence 
legislation and state actions. 
When looking at a major media outlet such as the BBC (2016), the definition given is “all 
those outside normal transit procedures, i.e. without documentation. The term "illegal migration" 
usually refers to people smuggling.  
While the term used by the BBC does begin to describe the people who have entered the 
Union in 2015, it still fails to fully describe the situation. 
The term “irregular migration” is used in many press releases about the refugee crisis to 
describe the current migration crisis because those seeking asylum after entering the EU started 
as unauthorized migrants, and then some tried to change their legal status after entering a 
Member State. Therefore, an asylum seeker falls in between international and national policy 
because migrants from outside the EU seek national protection and therefore do not just fall 
under the jurisdiction of international law but also the national law of a Member State. 
 
                                                
of a sending country, the irregularity come from instances where a person crosses an international border 
without without valid transport documentation, which is usually encountered in smuggling situations. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUALIZING AND DEFINING INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 
AND SECURITIZATION 
 
3.1. Intergovernmentalism 
Intergovernmentalism as a theory first entered the field of international relations in the 
1960s with the work of Stanley Hoffmann, who took it upon himself to explain why states as 
nationalistic as France could bring themselves to give up certain sovereign powers in order to 
promote a common market. This theory is based on the significance of the role of institutions in 
governing interstate relations. It is also based on the assumption that “international institutions 
favor negotiation by reducing transaction costs,” which are favorable for ‘low politics’ but in 
areas of high politics, such as sovereignty for example, “states endeavor to protect their powers 
and thus delegate them with the greatest parsimony” (Roche 2011).  
 The success of the European Union rests in the “proper functioning of states capable of 
fostering the opening of civil society and waiving certain attributes of their sovereignty” and also 
on the “awareness that neighboring states have converging interests, a fact that can be attributed 
to the accelerated maturity of an international anarchy in which sovereign states are in a free 
competition” (Roche 2011). Sovereignty does not, therefore, disappear but becomes pooled in 
this scenario. 
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Hoffmann’s theory suggested that the European Economic Community (Hoffmann’s 
theory is shaped by his analysis of the EEC) was a multiplier of power for weakened states 
because the decisions within the EEC would become the lowest common denominator, on which 
states could agree, something Lindberg explained was an important factor of prolonged 
integration. However, once the European Economic Community evolved into the European 
Union and its functions expanded and changed, the theory of intergovernmentalism also 
changed. 
 
3.2. Liberal intergovernmentalism 
 
Andrew Moravcsik entered the debate by adapting Hoffmann’s theory to the 1990s 
reality of the European Union and changing it to the so called “liberal intergovernmentalism”. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism focuses more on how the Member States governments are able to 
bargain within the European Union and still maintain executive capacity at the national level 
(Rosamond 2004, 139). 
While Hoffman analyzed how Charles De Gaulle promoted French national interests and 
its impact on European integration, Moravcsik focused more on the negotiations that led to the 
signing of the treaties developing the European Union and its monetary system. 
The European Union does not have a government but instead it has a multitude of 
national governments that are accountable to their respective citizens and a complex system of 
common institutions, rules and norms that have shaped and developed a Member State’s 
influence in the EU (Tsoukalis 2014, 74). That web of interdependence has been achieved 
through and built upon bargaining and intergovernmental negotiations over many years. 
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The enactment of the Economic and Monetary Union was an instance where states were 
willingly giving up their control over issues of central importance to national sovereignty. 
However, post 9/11 the threat of terrorism, especially home-grown terrorism forced states to 
reinforce and guard their sovereignty in order to secure their populations. The EU, due to its 
Member States’ interests also shifted its interest to include security, defense and border control. 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig’s (2009) definition of liberal intergovernmentalism rests 
on two basic assumptions about politics. First, that states are actors and second, that all states are 
rational.  
Thomas Risse (2009, 146) eloquently explained that intergovernmentalism as a theory is 
adequate to explain the evolvement and building of European institutions. In addition, it helps 
explain the reliance on agencies as forums of cooperation and sovereignty pooling. 
With that in mind, Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig (2009, 68) explain that 
the EU can be studied correctly if states are treated as critical actors in the context of anarchy. 
Furthermore, through intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining, states achieve their goals, 
without having to rely on a centralized authority to make and enforce political decisions. In 
addition, national security is not a dominant motivation in the decision making process. States as 
rational actors tend to calculate the utility of alternative courses of action and choose the one that 
maximizes (or satisfies) their utility under different circumstances. Basically, this means that EU 
integration can be understood as a series of rational choices by national leaders that respond to 
constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of each individual state in 
bolstering the importance of interstate commitments.  
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Integration in Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig’s theory will continue as long as states 
continue to rule by quasi-consensus with the fiscal, administrative and military power being 
decentralized to the individual Member States.  
“Absent a major and unforeseen exogenous shock, the EU is likely to develop 
incrementally, improving and reforming policies within the current confederal 
constitution framework, with member states ruling by quasi-consensus and fiscal, 
administrative, and coercive powers decentralized to the states (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 83)”.  
Therefore, policies such as political control over the major fiscal activities of the modern state, 
things like taxation, social welfare, immigration and citizenship, health care provisions, 
education, defense spending and criminal prosecution will remain in the national governments’ 
power.  
This paper further agrees with the idea put forth by the authors, that power over national 
security remains under Member State control when faced with question of national security, such 
as migration and asylum seeking, Member States will protect their own interest, and common 
interests will be pushed to the side. Ultimately, asylum and migration policy are security issues 
that are also of crucial importance to the nation state. The national government’s control over 
who is allowed to reside on its territory is one way a state retains its sovereignty (Kraft-Kasak 
and Shisheva 2008, 2)  
Catherine Gegout (2010) examines the effectiveness of the theory of 
intergovernmentalism when dealing with security issues and concludes that states are rational 
actors. When coming up with common policy, a state’s policy actually comes down to the 
individual state’s decision if cooperation is in its best interest. Again, the paper is consistent with 
her analysis, because when analyzing the common European asylum policy, it becomes apparent 
that national interests come first.   
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In addition, Gegout’s analysis shows that when Moravcsik was writing his book in 1998, 
and developing the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, he believed that foreign policy 
coordination had no immediate economic impact on the Monetary Union. Therefore, the practice 
of intergovernmentalism was not necessary and power would remain with national leaders 
(Moravcsik 1998, 478). 
Therefore, to breech the gap between the EU’s primary economic interests and its 
emerging interests in security and border control post-9/11, another theory is helpful. Migration 
and asylum policy is the perfect example of the creation of a policy in order to better deal with 
the so called “Other”. Jef Huysmans (2006) explains that the true nature of European integration 
“has fueled the securitization of migration in the region through the elevation of ‘illegal 
migration’ – phraseology that has come to include asylum seekers — to a security risk 
purportedly warranting regional-level policing and cooperation” (Gerard 2010, 39). The theory 
of securitization adds to the discussion because it helps to further explain why Member States 
will prefer to create national policy as opposed to creating opportunities for cooperation within 
the European institutions. 
3.3. Securitization 
Securitization theory can be understood in the context of the extreme politicization of 
migration and its presentation as a security threat (Léonard 2010, 231). Developed by Ole 
Wæver in collaboration with other researchers, who have come to be known as the Copenhagen 
School, this theory can be seen as a constructivist approach to security studies.9 It is based on the 
                                                
9 For this thesis, whenever constructivism is mentioned it will be assumed that I am using it to allude to 
the theory in international relations that many aspects of world affairs are socially constructed by humans, 
who are social beings, in the interest of creating a society and a nation-state. In the realm of security 
studies, the use of constructivist theory is to explain that threats are politically and socially created for 
social mobilization.  For a further conversation about the creation of threats see Huysman, 2002. 
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idea that security threats are socially constructed, which means that it is impossible to ever fully 
assess whether threats are ‘real’ or not because they will be constructed and defined by those 
who claim they are affected by said threats (be they governments, or society).  
The Copenhagen School believes that all security scholars should study the process 
through which an issue becomes socially constructed and recognized as a security threat. The 
way the Copenhagen School proposes the study should be done is by looking at the way 
discursive processes dramatize and prioritize an issue by presenting it as existential threat to the 
survival of the ‘referent object’ (i.e. a state, national identity etc.) and then the threat being 
accepted by the ‘audience’ of the speech act (i.e. the government, public opinion, etc.) as such 
(Léonard 2010, 235). The actor securitizing the issue is then able to claim that it requires 
emergency measures and justifies actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure 
(Buzan et al. 1998, 25 quoted in Léonard 2010, 235). For this school of thought there are no real 
security issues but only issues that have been perceived as threats through securitizing speech 
acts (Léonard 2010, 235). 
Alison Gerard (2010) argues that there are three steps in securitizing an issue such as 
migration. 
First, securitization seeps into policy development and implementation. Second, it is 
mobilized through political discourse that exaggerates the risks of migration and asylum, 
and either garners or diminishes allegiance to political parties. Third, securitization 
constructs migration as a security problem and proposes security-based solutions as the 
only viable remedy (39). 
However, some scholars who use this theory have argued that it is not necessary to only use the 
role of discourse in the practice of securitizing an issue because in some situations there is more 
of an emphasis on the importance of practices, bureaucratic structures or networks linked to 
security practices and the specific technologies they use (Bigo 2000, 194; Huysmans 2004 in 
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Léonard 2010, 235). For example, practices like creating institutions or agencies that militarize, 
migration can be seen as instances of securitization. More exactly, activities that can be seen to 
securitize asylum and migration are policies or activities that have traditionally been 
implemented to tackle issues largely perceived as security issues, such as drug trafficking, 
terrorism or a foreign invasion. In addition, those policies that are extraordinary, those never or 
rarely used in asylum and migration issues, can also be seen as ways to securitize migration and 
asylum seeking (Léonard 2010, 238). The use of force, both military and police, is a good 
example of a policy that ends up securitizing migration in order to create policy. Securitization 
does not occur at one specific moment in time, but it is more long-term and diffuse, especially 
when evaluating policy (Abrahamsen 2005 quoted in Léonard 2010). 
The reason why security studies have expanded to migration is because after the 9/11 
attacks, the fight against terrorism became linked with correctly managing migration and asylum 
policy (Huysmans 2006, 12). With the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London, the 
European Union’s security agenda changed and asylum and migration were implicated in this 
process.  
Boswell (2007) attributes the link between migration and the fight against terrorism to the 
Member States’ Interior Ministers’ weight in the European Union’s institutions. These officials 
were already dominating the EU decision-making process in asylum, migration and security 
policy and therefore were able to create policies that had their national interests at heart (Chou 
2009, 553). National interests, even according to Moravcisk’s theory, are important in how states 
will cooperate within each other with the EU institutional framework. In addition, Gegout’s 
(2010) analysis of intergovernmentalism and her conclusion that when faced with security issues, 
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such as terrorism, states will choose to look out for national interests as opposed to the interests 
of the EU is relevant.  
The link between the War on Terror and migration comes from world governments 
framing migration in relation to terrorism and the threat of crime (Bigo 2002, 63-64). The 
creation of threats, though, speaks to the the fear of the politician of losing his or her symbolic 
control over territorial boundaries in a world where freedom is always associated with danger 
and insecurity (Bigo 2002, 65). Alison Gerard (2010, 29) further explains that a state’s 
sovereignty is reasserted through the securitization of migration due to its likeness to punitive 
law and order approaches to affirm a sovereign’s ability to control crime. In addition, if states 
would give up the power to unilaterally decide who gets to live on their land and under what 
conditions they are allowed to do so, then the sovereign state as known in modern history would 
be transformed (Kraft-Kasak and Shisheva 2008, 2) 
Through the securitization of asylum and migration, there was a shift from the ‘low 
politics’ of humanitarian aid to the ‘high politics’ of security, with migration and asylum seeking 
being deemed or portrayed as a problem that could jeopardize national internal stability and 
security. Stanley Hoffman’s definition of intergovernmentalism, comes to mind because as he 
explained when it comes to ‘high politics’, Member States will try to conserve their power and 
will delegate it with greatest parsimony. This conservation of power speaks to Bigo’s argument 
of why an issue, like migration, gets securitized. European integration rests on cooperation 
between the Member States and for that to happen, they all need to agree on some basic 
principles that will not put their domestic policies in jeopardy. 
Jef Huysmans (2006, 73) sees that there are three factors in how migration became 
securitized within the European Union. First, there is the cultural significance of border control 
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and its implication on the free movement of people (through the Schengen Agreement and the 
Dublin Regulation). Second, there is the question of integration or assimilation of migrants into 
the domestic societies of the member states. Finally, there is the relationship between European 
integration and the development of multicultural societies. 
Coming from non-member states, refugees are culturally different to the citizens of 
European Union Members, which according to Huysman’s themes means the issue of migration 
can become securitized among the European Union’s Member States. Migration can bring 
people into a country that can be culturally different, such as the refugees coming by boat in 
2015. The difference in culture creates an an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ mentality where the Other is 
different and therefore a threat. Once a threat, as securitization theory explains, it will be dealt 
with in ways that end up militarizing the solution and using punitive national resources as 
opposed to restorative resources. Securitizing European migration and asylum seeking is 
connected to the creation of a European internal security field in which the securitization of 
cultural identity is subordinated to protecting European public order and safety (Huysmans 2006, 
118). Those who are outside of the European cultural identity are seen as threats and therefore 
dealt with as such. 
The passage of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) 
securitized migration in the way they sought to formalize the free movement of EU nationals and 
therefore creating strict external border controls keeping external migrants, or the so called 
‘Other’ out. In addition, with the transformation of the European Union as an ‘Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’ in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) there was an emphasis on security and 
an attempt, all to create a common cultural identity that was only available to European nationals 
and not migrants (Grewcock 2003, 121). Migration and asylum seeking became a problem that 
  22 
could jeopardize internal stability and security after internal borders were abolished with the 
Schengen Agreement’s entrance in European aquis.  
Therefore, before exploring the history of CEAS, it is important to understand that 
integration of Member States within the European Union happens only when there can be 
positive convergence of policy aims and national interests do not come before those of the EU. 
The convergence can then only happen at the lowest common denominator because then 
Member States governments are able to create domestic policy that has national support.  
The European Union is an institution with rules and norms created by Member States in 
order to better integrate policy and to share the burden of many issues facing European 
governments. That web of interdependence has been achieved and built over many years and 
according to Moravscik and Schimmelfennig, baring a catastrophic event, integration and 
cooperation cannot be shaken. However, when it comes to migration and asylum policy, states 
continually talk about it in securitized terms, which makes it difficult for the harmonization of 
common policies.  
Once an issue is securitized, and a threat is created, states will revert to their own 
sovereign power and be weary of creating opportunities of cooperation. Once 9/11 became the 
point in modern history where security concerns and the fight against terrorism became a 
priority, migration and asylum seeking policy was no longer an area of cooperation for better 
burden sharing but an area where Member States weighed their own interests in keeping the 
‘Other’ out. European integration no longer was reliant on quasi-consensus on fiscal and 
humanitarian issues, but reliant on keeping the Other out. 
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As it will be seen in the next section, through the history of migration and asylum policy, 
Member States’ interests changed and they finally created institutions that kept outsiders out 
even if it was at the cost of policy integration
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CHAPTER 4: SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN 
ASYLUM SYSTEM 
 
 
 To better understand the force of intergovernmental cooperation fin furthering European 
integration, looking at how asylum policy came about is helpful. In the following chapter, in a 
chronological manner it will be shown how decisions, regulations, directives and 
intergovernmental cooperation pushed the Europeanization of migration and asylum policy.10 
The legal duty of EU Member States to offer protection to refugees can be found in a 
combination of refugee, human rights and humanitarian law. The 1951 Geneva Convention on 
the Status of Refugees and the New York Protocol (1967), upon which the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS) is based, constitutes the centerpiece of international refugee protection. 
The Geneva Convention lays out basic minimum standards for the treatment of refugees, which 
the European Union follows in its directives (Velluti 2014, 10-11). In addition, the use of these 
two international Conventions, the principle of non-refoulement, the international law principle 
that a true victim cannot be returned to the persecution of a specific state actor is affirmed and 
protected by EU legislation.11
                                                
10 For the purposes of this paper the term ‘Europeanization’ will be defined as the process by which 
domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making (Bürzel 1999, 574) and as 
an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree in which European 
Union political and economic dynamics become part of the national policy making organizational 
structure (Ladrech 1994,69). 
 
11 Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention 
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Various reasons explain the Member States’ desire to create CEAS. First, a well 
functioning CEAS contributed to the image of the European Union as a protector of human 
rights, and secondly, a common procedure and a uniform asylum system would reduce a 
secondary movement of asylum-seekers across the EU searching for a better system. The 
harmonized system would then alleviate Member States from carrying out complex fact-finding 
tasks on their own because the burden would be shared among all Member States (Velluti 2014, 
15). 
 However, the European Union would not have been able to create a common system 
without gaining more competencies over migration and asylum policy over the years. Through 
the involvement of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in issues over the free movement of 
people from outside the Union, or the so called “third-country nationals” (TCNs), the European 
Union gained many legal competencies over issues that were usually left within the Member 
States’ power.  
The first step in giving the European Community the ability to deal with migration issues 
regarding those outside of the European Community was in the Treaty of Rome (1957) in Article 
59, which declared that the Council could act unanimously in a proposal from the Commission 
by extending the provisions of the free movement of services to nationals of a third country 
(TCN) who provided services within the Community. Citing a 1968 Council Document 
(Regulation (EEC) No 1968/1612/6), Chou (2009, 544) explains that the original economic logic 
underpinning European economic integration in the early years, was promoted by the free 
circulation of the factors of production (labor, services, goods and capital) and EC nationals were 
seen as part of factors of production, therefore being allowed to move freely. Therefore, 
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provisions also had to be made for TCNs due to them being another important factor of 
production. 
During the 1973 oil crisis, when people saw themselves forced to leave their countries 
seeking better economic opportunities in economically developed countries, the Council issued a 
resolution to establish a ‘social action program’ for all migrants irrespective of their nationalities. 
The Commission then asked in 1974 for the establishment of coordination of national policies of 
Member States towards migration and migrants at the Community level (Council Resolution, 
1976). By 1979, through its rhetoric, the Commission (European Commission 1979), was 
stressing that external migration regulation was a corollary to the Community policy of free 
movement of Community workers suggesting that internal and external migration were 
inseparable (Chou 2009, 545). 
In 1985, the Commission (1985) adopted an internal decision that forced all Member 
States to circulate to one another and the Commission, any draft or existent legislation regarding 
TCNs workers and their families. The Decision was based on Article 118 of the Treaty of Rome 
(1957).12 The measure, however, was challenged by five different Member States in front of the 
European Court of Justice (1987)13.  It is important to note that there already was a 
transformation of the idea of external migration from an economic discussion to a security 
discussion. The objections brought by the five member states were based on the fact that the 
conditions of entry, residence and employment of TCNs affected the Member States’ ability to 
                                                
12 This article gives the Commission competence to promote closer cooperation among the Member States 
in the social field (social security, labor law or working conditions, etc). 
 
13 Federal Republic of Germany, Kingdom of Netherlands, French Republic, United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and Kingdom of Denmark (ECJ 1987). 
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provide security for their own nationals (Chou 2009, 544-545). The ECJ (1987) rejected the 
security justification on the grounds that migration policy in relation to non-member states did 
not fall within the scope of domestic public-policy which was the only reason Member States 
could derogate from their treaty obligations. 
 Then in 1986, migration policy went through another process of Europeanization with the 
Iberian expansion to Spain and Portugal. Then the deliberations about migration policy at the EU 
level were framed in three main themes: the protection of public order and the preservation of 
domestic stability, challenges to the welfare state and questions about multiculturalism or the 
cultural composition of the nation (Huysmans 2006, 68).   
It became increasingly clear that there was a need for the communitarization14 of 
migration and asylum policy when countries like Germany and Austria came under enormous 
strain in the late 1980s and early 1990s when they tried coping with the asylum applications they 
received. They believed that the possible communitarization of their refugee problems might 
ease the strained circumstances they found themselves facing (Boccardi 2007, 211). Boccardi 
(2007, 211) explains though that in the negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty (1992) there was a 
German proposal to include asylum cooperation in the Union’s competencies under the First 
Pillar (or the Pillar handling economic, social and environmental policies) but it was quickly 
rejected by the other Member States. 
The full communitarization of migration and asylum policy had to wait until 1997 with 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Third Pillar on Justice and Home Affairs, made migration and 
asylum seeking EU issues that had to be dealt with through Member State cooperation. There 
                                                
14 See footnote 10. For the purposes of this paper the two words will be used interchangeably based on the 
definition of Europeanization given by Bürzel (1999). 
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was an acknowledgement that many common problems had both a global and a regional 
perspective. Asylum seeking becoming a European issue as opposed to just a national issue 
paving the way for the process of Europeanization of Member State’s practices and legislations 
(Velluti 2014, 13). 
Migration and asylum seeking, from the beginning, were caught in the debate within the 
European Union about irregular migration being a problem caused by international organized 
crime that could be seen as threat to democracy and civil society (Morrison and Crosland 2001, 
23). While powers given to the European Union aimed to deter organized crime they were 
already used to target ‘aliens’ as the main threat to to public order and State security (Mathiesen 
2000, 176).  
Consistent to Huysmans (2006) analysis, the protection of public order and domestic 
stability became an important factor as seen in the domination of security and border control 
policy in the European agenda by the end of the 1990s (Grewcock 2003, 122). It is then to no 
surprise that a special meeting of the European Council at the Tampere Summit in October 1999, 
set out the elements for a Common European Asylum System confirming its commitment to 
reinforcing the fight against serious organized and transnational crime in addition to creating 
minimum requirements for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers (Grewcock 2003, 122). 
The creation of CEAS, as explained by Velluti (2014) was motivated by the want to 
create an image of the EU as a protector of human rights but, as other authors point it was 
created in order to share the burden of dealing with organized crime and transnational crime. 
Asylum seeking gets caught in the discourse about transnational crime due to its links to human 
smuggling and other types of organized crime. The securitization of migration, and its impact on 
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integration (more exactly the creation of intergovernmental cooperation) becomes inherent to 
European integration. 
As can be seen in the reluctance of some Member States of communitarizing migration 
and asylum policy, the claim made by this thesis that when faced with security issues, which a 
Member State deems as threats to its people, it will revert to national policy and will not seek 
cooperation within the European Union, making the harmonization of common goals difficult, 
still stands true. 
Ultimately, despite a push toward the communitarization of asylum and migration policy, 
when Member States felt like their ability to provide security for their nationals would be put in 
danger, they would limit the European Community’s power. In the important pieces of the 
European asylum system explored below, there are mechanisms set up by Member States to be 
able to limit the pooling of sovereignty when faced with security issues. For example, the 
Schengen Agreement was made to facilitate the movement of people, but it can be restricted 
when faced with threats from the outside of the Union. The Dublin Regulations give a sense of 
responsibility for one Member State to decide who and under what conditions a TCN is allowed 
to live within the European Union but the technical and enforcement issues make it almost 
useless. Finally, the creation of Frontex, an institution made to pool resources to patrol and keep 
the external European border safe, shows the effect of securitization at the EU level and the 
limits put on the EU institutional framework, by Member States when dealing with security 
issues.
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CHAPTER 5: THE SCHENGEN AGREEMENT, DUBLIN REGULATION AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF FRONTEX  
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
Following with the claims made by the thesis that when faced with security issues, 
Member States will limit the power given to the European Union, the following chapter will look 
at three important pieces of the European asylum and migration policy to prove that claim.  
The Schengen Agreement is an illustration of successful intergovernmental cooperation 
for the benefit of furthering integration. Its incorporation into the European aquis influences how 
all other migration and asylum policy is treated because of the importance put on the free 
movement of people component of the Schengen aquis.  
The Dublin Regulations15 began as a intergovernmental cooperation project to burden 
share the effort of processing asylum seeking application, but has shown its failures when, first, 
Member States became parsimonious with the transferring sovereignty to other states for the 
decision of who gets to live on their land, and secondly due to the securitization of migration and 
border control.
                                                
15 In this chapter the Dublin III Regulation will be analyzed as it is the latest version of the regulation. The 
original Dublin Convention of 1990 set up the process of examining an asylum application, and then in 
2003 Dublin II Regulation was adopted, making a binding legislative that was required to be applied in its 
entirety in the Member States legislature. The 2013 Dublin III Regulation was signed in order to correct 
some of the deficiencies in efficiency seen by the Commission (Commission, 2008; Dublin II Regulation, 
2013). 
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Finally, Frontex will be a good example of the process of integrating resources in an 
institution, while in the process securitization migration and asylum seeking. These three 
components do not work independently of each other, but rather, complement and contrast each 
other to create a common European asylum system made up of puzzle pieces that do not seem to 
interlock fully.  
 
5.2. Schengen Agreement 
 
The Schengen Agreement of 1985 began with discussion between Germany, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg to create a territory where internal borders were 
abolished in lieu of a single external border. The Agreement (1985) was signed in June 1985 and 
then implemented through a Convention (1990), the abolition of internal border controls and the 
creation of a common visa were proposed. The Agreement took effect in 1995. With the Treaty 
of Amsterdam (1997), the Schengen Agreement was incorporated into the EU aquis which meant 
that it no longer had a treaty status but was part of the EU legislation and had to be followed as 
such. 
The Schengen acquis assures that there is a common policy regarding visas for short 
stays, asylum requests and border controls. Some of the key rules adopted with the Schengen 
acquis are the removal of check of persons at the internal border and common set of rules 
applying to people crossing EU Member States’ external borders, with a goal the better 
movement of people and goods within the European Union (Eur-Lex, 2009). 
Due to internal borders being abolished, the external EU border became more guarded 
and protected and Member States had the responsibility of guarding their share of the European 
external border, which is unevenly distributed considering the comparative lengths of their 
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respective borders as well as the natural geographical circumstances (Rijpma and Vermeulen 
2015, 454). Basically, while Member States never stopped guarding their own external borders, 
with the adoption of the Schengen Agreement, they were also doing it as part of their shared 
burden of guarding the European Union’s external border. 
Illustrating intergovernmentalism, the Schengen Agreement came out of 
intergovernmental negotiations between EU Member States in order to create better integration 
at the institutional level. The Agreement reflected the phase of turning the economic union into a 
political actor that was able to act by itself to protect the common market (Fischer 2012, 38). 
With the Maastricht Treaty (1992) creating a more complex administrative structure, the 
European Union was becoming more capable of creating policy and a culture of institutional 
cooperation was solidifying (Fischer 2012, 38). 
In addition, Schengen is much more than just an area without border controls and the free 
movement of people. It also includes intelligence gathering and sharing, all instances of 
securitizing the movement of people. The Schengen Information System is supposed to allow 
national border control and judicial authorities to obtain information on people and objects 
circulating within the Schengen zone (Dempsey 2016). 
As a growing political actor, the European Union alter received more power with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). Member States agreed to devolve national power to the European 
Parliament in many fields, including migration due to its importance to the advancement of the 
economic union (Fischer 2012, 45). Intergovernmental cooperation and the pooling of 
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sovereignty at the EU level became important in order to guard the so called Four Freedoms of 
the internal market.16 
 
5.3. Dublin Regulations 
 
Due to the burden put on Germany and Austria in dealing with asylum applications in the 
early 1990s, and later with the shared responsibility of protecting the EU’s external border, in 
order to share the burden, another mechanism was created in 1990. The Dublin Regulation was 
originally established by the Dublin Convention (1990) only four days before the implementation 
of the Schengen Agreement. The main purpose was the harmonization of asylum policy and 
most importantly the rules of responsibility among the Member States in order to prevent the so 
called ‘asylum shopping’. Cooperation for this Convention came from the asylum crises in the 
beginning of the 1990s when large Member States were under pressure due to the increasing 
number of asylum seekers during the Balkan Wars (Fischer 2012, 75-76). It does need to be 
noted that it is not very clear what international event prompted the Dublin Convention. There 
are many factors involved, such as the Schengen Agreement coming into force and due to its 
effect on borders, Member States wanted to have a mechanism that would deter future asylum 
seekers from abusing the system, or the end of the Cold War and its impact on the amount of 
migrants from Central and Eastern Europe looking for better conditions in Western Europe. The 
explanation is beyond the scope of this project and therefore cannot be broached here.    
At first, deals were signed between Member States regarding asylum policy due to the 
legal emphasis on the return of irregular migrants because Member States preferred to return the 
                                                
16 The Four Freedoms are: Free movement of goods, free movement for workers, free movement of 
services and freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. 
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illegal entrants overland to the last Member State from which they had entered rather than the 
much more expensive option of returning them to their respective homeland. The return of 
migrants resulted in the disproportionate arrest duration or people going underground, as for 
example in the Czech Republic (a recent Member of the European Union) or Germany where a 
document was issued to the person in question to leave the Schengen area without actually 
making sure the person left and them becoming illegal migrants who were hiding from the law 
(Fischer 2012, 78).  
One of the main reasons for the signing of the Dublin Agreement was a need to 
communitarize the burden of the bureaucracy of the asylum seeking process and not actually to 
create a common migration and asylum policy. The fundamental idea of the Dublin Agreement 
was based on a solidarity component, according to which a State bearing the biggest 
responsibility for the entry into the common territory of an asylum seeker was the State in which 
the application was processed. Only one Member State could be responsible for the burden of 
processing the claim and everything that came with it (investigation, cataloguing, financial 
burden etc.) (Boccardi 2007, 212-213).  
In addition, the Internal Market’s objective required minimal rules to reduce internal 
circulation of irregular migrants such as asylum-seekers, and subsequently securitizing 
migration. According to Boccardi (2007) Schengen and Dublin tried to do just that in allocating 
responsibility for asylum applications to all Member States, but to achieve such a goal, only 
minimum mutual recognition rules were introduced (213). In addition, for Dublin to work, 
Member State are asked to fingerprint all of the asylum seekers entering their territory. 
Robert Fischer (2012) in his book The Europeanization of Migration Policy: The 
Schengen Acquis between the Priorities of Legal Harmonization and Fragmentation does an 
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outstanding job analyzing the time it takes from the moment fingerprints are taken to the moment 
they get sent to the European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) Central Unit. His analysis shows a 
significant delay in the processing of information, and implementation of the system. In 2009 for 
example, the worst delay was the average 54.99 days in Greece. He also shows that the Dublin 
Regulation relieves the middle and north European destination Member States at the expense of 
southern European Member States which have become the emphasis of illegal border crossings 
(Fischer 2012, 85-91). 
The European Dactyloscopy is the fingerprint data base for identifying asylum seekers 
and irregular border-crossers and is part of the European Commission and Dublin’s success rests 
on it.  The data base insures that authorities are able to determine whether asylum seekers have 
already applied for asylum in another EU Member State or have illegally crossed borders. Called 
the ‘electronic heart’ of the European asylum system, it has come under fire due to the policy of 
keeping asylum seekers’ information on file for 10 years as opposed to the 1.5 years for other 
irregular migrants. Its necessity is still uncertain because, access to the database is not only 
granted to immigration authorities but also police and public prosecutors, such as Europol. Due 
to the fact that only migrants are recorded in such a way it gives the impression that asylum 
seekers are criminals and must be dealt with as offenders or potential suspects (Dernbach 2015). 
In addition, one of the main failures of the Dublin III Regulation (2013), is that many 
Member State’s conditions for the newly arrived refugees are so mediocre that larger, wealthier 
Member States refuse to send the refugees back to them when they discover they had not applied 
for asylum in the first country of the Union they had entered. In the 2015 refugee crisis, many 
Member States did not have efficient systems to register migrants and asylum seekers and 
therefore the Dublin Regulation was inefficiently used (Dempsey 2016).   
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5.4. Frontex 
Through the cooperation and discussions that came following the Treaty of Nice (2001) 
and the importance given to the principle of majority, the Council debated the creation of an 
entity that could harmonize security within the European Union. The European Union Member 
States wanted an agency that controlled the migration flows across European borders. With the 
signing of the Schengen Agreement, the internal customs and border posts were abandoned and 
replaced by watch towers and radar detection systems at the external borders of the EU; the outer 
border of the EU was marked by heightened control mechanisms, new surveillance technologies 
and a paramilitary deployment of patrol boats, border agents and aircraft (Casas-Cortes, 
Cobarrubias and Pickles 2013, 38). The external European border became highly militarized and 
the question of migration control also became highly securitized. 
In addition, after 9/11, within the European Union, there was a reiteration of the 
assumption that sources of insecurity must come from ‘outside’ and that immigration was a large 
source of outsiders (Neal 2009, 339). The management of the common external borders fell 
under contention because there was a question about which EU institution had jurisdiction over 
it. Therefore, the EU created an agency, which showed the shift from an intergovernmental 
approach of managing the external border to that of an institutional approach (Neal 2009, 343).  
To manage the security personal and resources of guarding the European external border, 
the European Agency for Management of Operational Control at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union, later known as Frontex was created (Regulation No 
2007/2004). 
According to Neal (2009) Frontex was not created to securitize migration but in response 
to the disintegration of a common EU response to migration, security and borders. Due to its 
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ability to act as an independent agent it can be a tool in the securitization as opposed to being a 
result of it (346). 
The agency’s creation was prompted by three main factors. First, by how contentious 
migration flows had become in Europe since the end of the Cold War, which led to several 
Member States taking various measures to curb the number of migrants, including the 
strengthening of border controls to restrict access to their territory. Second, the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements of the EU brought some concerns about the ability of the new Member States to 
control the new external border of the EU. Then, the fight against terror in the War on Terror led 
to the tightening of external border controls (Léonard 2010, 234). An agency like Frontex was 
necessary to harmonize the effort of securing and tightening the external EU border.  
Frontex’s primary mandate is to coordinate the flow of information (data analysis and the 
plans of action at the border) between Member States (Klusmeyer, 2009, 224). It is a semi-
autonomous agency founded to coordinate the control of the EU’s external borders in 
collaboration with all member states (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, Pickles, 2013). The agency 
promotes a common EU policy for border security. Based on its website, 17 it  has several areas of 
activity. It plans, coordinates, implements, trains and analyzes intelligence on the ongoing 
situation at the external borders and provides a rapid response capability by using the Member 
States’ staff and equipment at the external borders (FRONTEX 2016). Most importantly, Frontex 
extends the efforts of EU Member States to control borders but it has grown into a separate and 
increasingly powerful agency while also enjoying a high degree of independence (Dünnwald 
2011). For example, “sea patrols along the African shores are joint operations. They are run 
                                                
17 Its ‘Mission and Tasks’ subpage more exactly: http://Frontex.europa.eu/about-Frontex/mission-and-
tasks/ 
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under the responsibility of one member state involved, and are coordinated by Frontex” 
(Dünnwald 2011, 114). While Member States act as lead of a joint project, Frontex does the 
coordination, organization of the material and staff while also managing the equipment 
(Dünnwald 2011, 114). Frontex sea operations are concentrated on the sea between the Canary 
Islands, and the African coast, the Strait of Gibraltar, the sea between Libya, Tunisia, Malta and 
the southern Italian islands, and the Greek-Turkish border, focusing on Greek islands just 
offshore the Turkish coast (Dünnwald 2011, 114).  
Though independent, Frontex does rely on financial support from the European Union, in 
addition to Member States’ equipment. In 2015, due to the large influx of refugees to the Union, 
the agency was given a 54 percent budget increase as part of a package of incentives to tackle the 
continent’s refugee and migrant situation. In 2016, its budget will reach 176 million Euros, while 
also increasing its headquarters staffing from 304 to 340 people (Mathiason, Parsons and Jeory, 
2015). With all of these changes, Frontex declares it will have the ability to work with Europol in 
returning illegal migrants while also providing safe passage to what the agency calls ‘genuine 
refugees’ and also disrupting people-smuggling rings (Mathiason, Parsons and Jeory, 2015).  
As Fischer’s (2012) analysis showed, EURODAC has been plagued by delays and 
inconsistencies for many years, therefore, Frontex has had to develop new fingerprint processing 
technology. However, there were some shortcomings which made the processing of the irregular 
migrants coming into Europe in 2015 difficult (Mathiason, Parsons and Jeory 2015). Individual 
countries have hindered the Agency’s ability to become a strong EU agency because countries 
like Germany Austria and other EU countries have declined to give Frontex the support it needs. 
Support, such as high quality personnel and financial support, has not come from many EU 
countries due to their refusal to cooperate (Dempsey 2016). 
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While Frontex declares it is only coordinating with Member States, the role of Frontex is 
not only a coordinating one because coordinating operations consists of assigning and supporting 
Member States only when needed. While the Commission is involved in the planning of the 
Frontex operations, it is not involved in its operational plan and therefore Frontex not only 
supports Member States’ activities but also directs operations (Mungianu 2013, 379). 
The joint operations however have not always been successful and have been criticized 
for militarizing border control because migration and asylum seeking have been securitized by 
being dealt with by the military and armed forces, which are usually used in a war environment 
or a situation of immediate danger. In addition, Frontex and Europol have created a close 
relationship and have shared competences. Just the mere fact that all persons that are intercepted, 
returned or prevented from entering EU territory, are treated as illegal immigrants, means that no 
provision is made for potential asylum-seekers. Therefore, EU Member States are not respecting 
their international obligations in providing a safe environment while also abiding by the non-
refoulement principle (Léonard 2010, 240-241). 
Frontex is providing RABITs, or Rapid Border Intervention Teams.18 Greece, dealing 
with the large influx of irregular migrants, requested the assistance of Frontex, through the use of 
RABITs, in December 2015 in addressing the number of migrants arriving on its islands. In a 
press release Frontex (2015) made clear that there were going to be larger numbers of officers 
and technical equipment provided to support Greece in an operation named Poseidon Rapid 
Intervention. In this operation, Frontex specified there was going to be a greater emphasis on 
                                                
18 According to Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 the members of RABITs are placed under the 
responsibility of the host Member State and they follow its instructions while taking actions under the 
supervision of national border controls. They remain officers of their Member State, authorizing them to 
still carry their service weapon and uniform with a blue armband with the EU and Frontex insignia on it. 
In addition, they are allowed to use force and are liable for any damage they cause (EUR-Lex 2007). 
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security checks. The checks would be done by providing Greece with the help from “experts in 
screening, debriefing, fingerprinting and forged documents from various EU Member States and 
Schengen Associated Countries” (Frontex 2015). The collected information would then be 
shared with national governments and Europol. 
The surveillance and controls used to address the migration crisis in 2015 show that 
methods traditionally used to address security issues are becoming adequate in dealing with 
migrants and asylum seekers, which speaks to the securitization of migration. Sold as a 
cooperation between Member States to secure borders, what these RABITs actually do is to 
embody the application of a mechanism that historically is used in dealing with emergencies and 
acute threats such as foreign armed attacks. Reminiscent of the ‘solidarity clause’ of NATO, the 
cooperation of all Member States is required unless there would be a threat to national security 
required by the discharge of national tasks.  
It is then not surprising that in January 2016, NATO and Frontex announced that they 
would cooperate in the Aegean Sea in an operation that will bring additional support to the 739 
officers, staff and crew members on the Greek islands who were already there when the 
announcement was made (Frontex 2016). 
There is also a system that works jointly with Frontex that was created mainly to “prevent 
illegal immigration and cross-border crime at the external borders” and to ensure “the protection 
and saving the lives of migrants trying to reach European shores” (EUR-Lex 2014). Presented by 
the European Commission as a new tool to save migrants’ lives and prevent crimes at the EU 
borders, the European border surveillance system, known as Eurosur, is multi-purpose and it 
provides mechanisms for border surveillance through national coordination in order to ensure a 
faster response to information about new routes and methods used by criminal networks (EUR-
  41 
Lex 2014). It was put into effect in 2013 and has not had time to fully have an impact on 
Frontex’s operations. 
Ultimately, one of Frontex’ issues is the lack of substantial funding and the capabilities to 
react to a crisis do not refer “to the ability to perform actions to save lives, but only to the ability 
to perform actions against illegal migration” (Rijmpa and Vermeulen 2015, 466). 
In conclusion, The Schengen Agreement began through intergovernmental cooperation 
between Member States and its effect was felt on how the European Union managed its border, 
external border in lieu of the abolished internal borders. While the Agreement did not spark a 
change in the EU, it was an illustration of the direction the European Union, was heading into. 
Following the free-movement of people provisions that came with Schengen, a bureaucratic 
mechanism such as the Dublin Regulation was needed. Sharing the burden of processing asylum 
application, did create problems over the transference of sovereignty to other Member States first 
and then to the European Union as a whole.  
In addition, the failures of EURODAC in being able to handle a large influx of data and 
applications, rendered the Dublin Regulation weak and hard to enforce. Also, due to the different 
economic conditions across the EU, with smaller Member States not being able to accommodate 
large amounts of irregular migrants and their applications and allowing them to leave in search 
for a larger Member State able to process them, enforcing the Dublin Regulations has also been 
difficult. 
As some authors in this chapter argued, the common European asylum policy has its 
inefficient issues and the creation of Frontex was supposed to ameliorate some of those 
inefficient issues. It was however, not given enough power by other Member States, and it has 
become a tool of securitization.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Migration and asylum seeking have been at the basis of the European project since its 
inception. In the Treaty of Rome (1957) the Council was given the ability to act unanimously in 
extending provisions of the free movement of services to TCNs because of their importance to 
the common European economic goals. In addition, the Geneva Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (1951) and the New York Protocol (1967), are all components of European 
treaties, directives and regulations regarding the treatment of migrants and asylum seekers. The 
later created Common European Asylum System, stands on these two international treaties. 
At the height of the oil crisis, when TCNs were looking for work in affluent European 
countries, the EC created provisions for them and their families through intergovernmental deals 
and agreements. 
In the 1980s the debate about migration policy, at the Member State level, was divided 
into three main themes: the protection of public order and domestic stability, the challenges of 
the welfare state of accommodating the new arrivals and questions about multiculturalism and 
the maintenance of the European identity. All of these themes are consistent with fears created 
by Member State governments to securitize migration. As exemplified in the ECJ challenge 
coming from some major Member States in 1987 to the decision to cooperate on the free 
movement of TCNs, when talking about migration and asylum seeking as threats, EU Member 
States tended to be weary of transferring sovereignty powers to the EU and to each other.
  43 
However, while Member States were weary of the transfer of power, the EC had the 
prerogative that all people would be treated fairly no matter where they came from and what 
Member State they wanted to live and work in based on the commitments it had made to the 
international community through its treaties. 
As time went on and the Berlin Wall came down, the Cold War ended, and there was 
potential for mass migration from Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s–early 1990s, in 
addition to the crisis in the Former-Yugoslavian nations, European Member States saw 
themselves having to share the burden of processing of migrants and asylum seekers. States like 
Germany came under enormous strain (almost reminiscent of the 2015 crisis) coping with 
asylum application, which forced Member States to seek the communitarization of migration and 
asylum policy just to be able to share the burden amongst all Member States. 
Once migration and and asylum seeking were fully communitarized, with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997) by being put under the Third Pillar on Justice and Home Affairs, 
intergovernmental cooperation was necessary and required and the only opt-out was to cite 
security concerns and therefore needing to revert to national policy as opposed to EU policy. 
By the end of the 1990s, with the adoption of the Schengen Agreement into the EU aquis, 
and its subsequent effect on the European internal borders, the securitization of border control, 
became inherent in European integration. The Schengen aquis made national borders, also 
European borders and added the component of the EU involvement in national interests and 
powers. Securitization, thus became inherent in the European integration project. 
Then, after 9/11, asylum seekers and migrants, were seen as being involved with the 
height in terrorism threats, civil unrest and other issues pertaining to national security. The 
European Union was still following its commitment to non-refoulement and the protection of 
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human rights, but the regulations and directive that came after the terrorist attacks in the early 
2000s19, did have a more focused approach on security and most importantly securitizing 
migration and asylum seeking. 
In addition, the involvement of Member States in CEAS, changes how efficient the 
system actually is. Due to a lack of support, both economic and logistical, CEAS has been 
plagued by inefficiencies since the beginning. 
The Dublin Regulations, plagued by issues of inefficiency, illustrate what happens when 
Member States refuse to fully allow other Member States to make decisions for them, in addition 
to illustrating how the difference in economic and political capabilities across the EU, deeply 
influence the application of the regulation. In the 2015 crisis, it was hard to enforce the Dublin 
regulation in Greece, the first country many of the irregular migrants landed in, due to a lack of 
economic resources. Refugees and asylum seekers were allowed to leave Greece without being 
fingerprinted, putting in jeopardy the effectiveness of EURODAC and the Dublin III Regulation. 
 Then, the creation of Frontex was meant to consolidate the protection of the 
external border in addition to dealing with irregular migration as a centralized institution. It’s 
reliance on Member States to give resources and personnel leaves it open to failure because 
when Member States refuse to cooperate, the institution does not have enough power to fully do 
its job. Therefore, in 2016, it comes to no surprise Frontex asked for NATO aid.  
                                                
19 The terrorist attacks on 9/11 is seen by many scholars as a turning point in the creation of 
threats worldwide, but for it would be wrong to forget the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and 
the London attacks in 2006. The European terrorist attacks in the early 2000s changed how 
countries saw foreigners, of which being asylum seekers. The analysis of each European terrorist 
attack and its influence on EU legislation is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it worthy of 
research. 
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This thesis’ claim that the European Union’s response to the large increase in irregular 
migration into EU territory in 2015 shows the limits of the European institutional framework in 
the realm of asylum policy still stands after looking at the history of asylum policy and analyzing 
the institutions, directives and regulations that make it up. While there is much cooperation 
within the European Union, when faced with security issues, it has been proven throughout the 
years, Member States will be reticent of giving up sovereignty to each other and to EU 
institutions.  
To conclude a paper regarding such a current topic seems almost impossible. Things 
change everyday and it is impossible to make predictions about the future of the European 
asylum and migration system.  
Maybe the numbers of irregular migrants such as refugees and asylum seekers will lower 
but people will not stop from coming to the continent and this means that the European Union in 
order to insure its survival and also abide by its guiding principles, should create a common 
asylum policy that all Member States can follow and do not threaten their sovereignty. 
The dysfunction within CEAS is damaging to the Member States themselves because 
they leave themselves opened to security issues and costly solutions. Once the migration and 
asylum system no longer was an issue that needed to be dealt with in order to allow the free 
movement of workers within the EU, but an issue of security and state sovereignty, this policy 
area became less integrated due to Member States being less willing to cede more power for 
intergovernmental agreements to be negotiated. 
Following the definitions given by the intergovernmentalism authors used in the paper, 
integration can only continue when states pool resources and sacrifice sovereignty in order to 
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communitarize issues, share the burden of acting on said issues and subsequently gain more 
support within their own countries and domestic policy. 
Such a practice existed in the negotiations for the first regulations on migrant workers 
and then in the Schengen Agreement and Dublin Regulations. However, even in those 
negotiations, Member States were unenthusiastic about ceding power over to the European 
Union because they were giving up control over their territories and the decision making process 
of how the new migrants would be allowed to live on them. 
The theory of securitization is suitable to explain why states would be unenthusiastic and 
almost unwilling to cooperate with other states within the European Union when it came to 
migration and asylum policy. Securitizing an issue means that it is immediately dealt with as a 
threat to the well being of the state and its population. Due to the link between migration and 
terrorism and the subsequent fight in the War on Terrorism after 9/11, the issue became highly 
securitized and Member States were more reticent to give up power over the ability to decide 
who would be allowed to live on their territories.  
While the theory of securitization was created after analyzing state discourse, other 
authors used in this paper showed that even practices that tend to militarize issues can be 
considered examples of behavior that securitizes policy issues. The creation of Frontex is an 
example of creating an institution that deals with migration and especially irregular migration, as 
a security threat where security-based solutions were the only viable remedies.  
When faced with an issue such as the sudden influx of irregular migrants in 2015, 
Member States did not fully use CEAS, which had been set in place in 1999 in order to deal with 
a situation such as this. The Dublin Regulations have also not been enforced truly due to lack of 
resources and unwillingness from Member States to fully cooperate with each other. 
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A humanitarian aid crisis as described by the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of 
Refugee, the 2015 refugee crisis was however dealt with by security-based solutions. Arrests, 
deportations, borders closing and heightened police presence, are all actions used in times of war 
or grave danger to societies, and not in humanitarian crises. In addition, the principle of non-
refoulement has not been followed one-hundred percent of the time, because many irregular 
migrants were returned to Turkey in the spring of 2016. 
Furthermore, ‘asylum-shopping’, something of which EU officials had been afraid, has 
become a serious issue in the status-quo due to the differences in resources Member States are 
able to offer to the large influx of irregular migrants. 
Not having a strong enough common asylum system creates issues not only for the 
security of the European Union as a whole but also for its Member States’ abilities to sustain the 
agreements signed in the negotiation efforts emphasized by intergovernmentalists. CEAS was 
created in order to first contribute to the image of the EU as a protector of human rights and then 
as a common procedure that would ultimately reduce secondary movement of asylum seekers 
across the EU searching for a better system. The 2015 refugee crisis showed exactly how a 
powerless system made up of minimums, created exactly the problem it was trying to prevent. 
People leaving Greece and not filing for asylum there and going on foot to Germany to apply, 
just because the national asylum process is more streamlined and more welcoming, is a great 
example of how CEAS has failed the European Union. 
The Schengen Agreement, a true example of intergovernmentalism, has been put in 
jeopardy by Member States restricting the free movement of people and migrants by closing 
borders and augmenting the border controls just because they could not rely on a system they had 
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previously created to avoid a situation in which they would have to close borders to protect their 
internal security. 
 Much remains to be research and analyzed regarding this policy issue. This paper is a 
small piece of a larger research field that is ever changing due to the changing power dynamics 
within the European Union and even more importantly due to the ramifications of securitizing 
migration and the subsequent links to the War on Terror. The Common European Asylum 
System is a system created by good intentions but rendered powerless and almost nonexistent by 
actors being ruled by fear. 
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